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of the Common Heritage Concept to Plant
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IKECHI MGBEOJI∗

Abstract
Until the emergence of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992 and the FAO Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources in 2001, opinion had hardened in some quarters that the principle of a
common heritage of mankind regulated international transfer of plant genetic resources. By a
historical analysis of customary international law in the colonial age and the recent pedigree
of the principle of common heritage, this article points out the fallacies in such arguments and
contends that plants have always been subject to various national jurisdictions. It has to be
conceded, however, that contemporary developments in the ﬁeld of international law relating
to plant genetic resources foretell the emergence of a regime of multilateral relationships
governing access to plant genetic resources. If it is to depart from its unfortunate history, such
a regime of multilateral co-operation would have to pay serious regard to the issue of equitable
access to and sustainable use of plant genetic resources.

Key words
common heritage of mankind; North–South relations; plant genetic resources; sovereignty;
sustainable development

Although the Westphalian character of international law confers on states sovereign jurisdiction over their respective territories, it is a truism in terms of the geography and distribution of plants for use as food that no single state has ever been
wholly self-sufﬁcient for its food needs. All the states of the world are interdependent as regards plant life forms. As a consequence of the irreplaceable and multiple
roles, value, and functions of plants, there has always been an inescapable measure of international interaction and co-operation over plants and derivatives from
plants. However, a critical analysis of the directional ﬂow and methods of transfer of
plants from one state or region to another reveals an asymmetrical and inequitable
regime. Crudely speaking, although most plant resources for use as food originate
∗
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from the so-called Third World, the irony is that such resources tend to be moved
from the poor, industrializing parts of the world to the richer, industrialized part.
It is in the light of this asymmetry that complex and rhetorical debates have often
surrounded the question of legal ownership of plants, particularly in the era prior
to the emergence of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture.1
Debates, or rather controversies, on the legal status of plants in the era following on the European colonization of the Americas, Africa, parts of Asia, and
elsewhere have reﬂected the problematic North–South divide and the perception
of inequality of access to economic resources.2 With particular reference to plant
genetic resources, there is considerable evidence to support the observation that
the transfer of plant germ plasm and products has been in the direction of the ‘developed’ world from the ‘developing’3 world. More importantly, there is a general
impression held by the ‘developing world’ and concerned scholars, activists, and
sympathizers in the ‘developed world’ that the ‘developing world’ has little or
nothing to show for the interaction or ‘exchange’ between both ‘worlds’. In other
words, the relationship between the ‘North’4 and the ‘South’5 in matters relating to

1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

Convention on Biological Diversity, entered into force on 19 Dec. 1993, reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM 813.
I am aware of the complexities and challenges faced by modern scholars in articulating, theorizing, and
deploying the distinctions and gross disparities existing between the so-called ‘North’ and its besieged
counterpart, the ‘South’. For an interesting analysis of this issue see K. Mickelson, ‘Rhetoric and Rage: Third
World Voices in International Legal Discourse’ (1997) 16 Wisconsin International Law Journal 353. See also
notes 4 and 5, infra.
As other scholars of international law, particularly those of the Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL) such as Makau Wa Mutua, Obiora Okafor, Anthony Anghie, and James Gathii, have rightly pointed
out, the concept of ‘development’ or lack thereof is a value-laden term with implicit hierarchies of cultures
and civilizations. Within this logic, history and civilization is construed as linear and unidirectional, with
Western civilization at the vanguard pointing the way for ‘lesser’ ‘underdeveloped’ peoples and cultures to
follow. See M. Wa Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ (2001) 42 Harvard
International Law Journal 201; D. Slater, ‘Contesting Occidental Visions of the Global: The Geopolitics of
Theory and North–South Relations’ (1994) (Dec.) Beyond Law 97; I. Mgbeoji, ‘Patents and Plant-ResourcesRelated Knowledge: Towards a Regime of Communal Patents for Plant-Resources Related Knowledge’, in
N. Islam et al. (eds.), Environmental Law in Developing Countries: Selected Issues (2002), at 81.
The term ‘North’ refers to the countries of North America and Europe, New Zealand, Japan, and Australia.
They are also called the ‘rich’ or the ‘advantaged’ countries of the world. For the purposes of convenience, they
may further be categorized as members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) which has 24 member countries, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See OECD in Figures: Statistics on the
Member Countries, 1988 edition: Supplement to the OECD Observer No. 152 (1988), at 4–5; H. Weidner, ‘The United
States and North–South Technology Transfer: Some Practical and Legal Obstacles’ (1982–3) 1–2 Wisconsin
International Law Journal, 205; A. Sawyer, ‘Marginalization of Africa and Human Development’ (1993) 5 African
Journal of International and Comparative Law 176. I am aware of the crudeness of this distinction. There are
nuances to the North–South paradigm. There is a ‘North’ in the ‘South’ as exempliﬁed by privileged and
‘Westernized’ elites of the ‘Third World’.
The term ‘South’ refers to the countries of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America, and Oceania.
They are also called the ‘developing countries’, ‘less-developed’, or the ‘third world’, countries of the world.
Considering the similar experiences of indigenous minorities of North America, Australia, and Europe, it
cannot be denied that there is a ‘South’ in the North. See M. Watkins, ‘North–South Relations’ (1975) 5
Alternatives: Perspectives on Society and Environment 33. For an excellent analysis of the nature of the economic
and cultural divide between North and South, see N. Adams, Worlds Apart: The North–South Divide and the
International System (1993); G. Lundestad, East, West, North and South: Major Developments In International
Politics 1945–1986 (1988). It should be noted that, as a concept, ‘the third world is far from a homogenous
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the exchange of plant germ plasm has been largely characterized by many Third
World scholars and their sympathizers as unequal, unfair, and skewed in favour
of the industrialized ‘North’. As I have argued elsewhere,6 the methods of transfer and ‘exchange’ of plant life forms between the North and the South reveal the
appropriative function of the dominant cultural paradigm and its subordination
of non-Western scientiﬁc frameworks or cultures to Eurocentric empiricism and
epistemology.
This article examines the correctness of the prevalent notion that plants are part
of the common heritage of mankind and thus an integral element of the global
commons freely available to all mankind. A critical assessment of this common
notion is necessary partly because in the course of the ‘exchange’ or transfer of
plant germ plasm from the ‘developing world’ to the ‘developed world’, there has
been an assumption of the existence of a legal concept or principle of common
heritage in respect of plants. In other words, there seems to be a generally shared
view, albeit erroneous, that prior to the emergence of the CBD in 1992 and the
FAO Treaty in 2001, which respectively categorized plant resources as subject to
domestic and national jurisdiction, plant life forms occurring within state boundaries belonged to all peoples of the world as part of the common heritage. It is the
purpose of this article to demonstrate the fallacy and incorrectness of such notions,
particularly as they occur in relevant literature on the ownership and control of
plant genetic resources. The article also seeks to shed some light on contemporary
developments in the ﬁeld of international law relating to access to plant genetic
resources.
My analysis proceeds in two stages. In stage one, I examine the historical and
legal foundations, and the circumstances and contexts in which plant germ plasm
was moved from the tropics to the colonies. This particular epoch is located
within the imperial and colonial era, when many parts of the Third World
were subjected to formal colonialism and imperialism. In the second stage
of my analysis, I demonstrate the recent pedigree of the common heritage
concept and, hence, the improbability of such a concept constituting the
legal basis for the transfer of plant germ plasm from the ‘developing world’
to the ‘developed world’ in the colonial era. In sum, I argue that the concept
of common heritage neither justiﬁed the colonial appropriation of plants nor
constituted a legal basis for international transactions relating to plant genetic
resources. Indeed, it is further argued in this article that the concept of common
heritage is inapplicable to plant genetic resources in contemporary international
law.

6.

group. There are no strict criteria for qualifying as a developing country . . . In the United Nations they form
the Group of 77, although the group at present consists of more than 130 states.’ See I. Seidl-Hohenveldern,
International Economic Law (1989), at 4; W. Langley, ‘The Third World: Towards a Deﬁnition’, (1981) 2 Boston
College Third World Law Journal 1.
I. Mgbeoji, ‘Patents and Traditional Knowledge of the Uses of Plants: Is a Communal Patent Regime Part of
the Solution to the Scourge of Bio-piracy?’ (2001) 9 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 163.
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1. T HE C OLUMBIAN E XCHANGE AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
OVER PLANTS
For purposes of historical convenience rather than exactness, the origins of state
‘transfer’ of plants may be traced to the ‘Columbian Exchange’ of 1492, during
Christopher Columbus’s forays into the Americas with some plant germ plasm. It
is already known that the Columbian Exchange, as it were, changed the face of the
earth, in terms of both the spread and distribution of human populations and the
realignment of global geopolitical power. For the narrower purposes of this analysis,
it is signiﬁcant that Columbus returned to Europe with maize in 1493, and in 1494
went back to the Americas with wheat, olives, chickpeas, onions, radishes, sugar
cane, and citrus fruits (for scurvy) to support a European colony.7
Subsequent voyages by other European explorers and settlers added potatoes
to the diet of Europe, resulting in a phenomenal increase in European population.8
Furthermore, the introduction of new plant resources into European diet and agriculture and the settlement of Europeans in the Americas fundamentally reconﬁgured
global economic and political equations. As Jack Kloppenburg observes:
[M]aize and potatoes had a profound impact on European diets. These crops produce
more calories per unit of land than any other staple but cassava [another New World
crop that spread quickly through tropical Africa]. As such, they were accepted, though
often reluctantly, by peasantries increasingly pressed by enclosures and landlords, and
by a growing urban proletariat.9

Since Columbus’s sporadic and disorganized transfer of plants from the ‘New
World’ to the ‘Old World’ and from parts of the New World to other parts of the same
New World, the critical importance of ‘exotic’ plant germ plasm has never been
lost on the political leaders of Europe, the Americas, and subsequently Australasia.
Indeed, in Europe a worldwide network devoted to the collection of germ plasm
from the colonial outposts of the North in the South was quickly put in place,
hence the origin of the botanical gardens, particularly in the British Empire.10 These
institutions routinely collected the world’s plant resources, of which a decisive
majority was tropical or subtropical in origin. Given that most of these tropical
and subtropical territories and peoples were under European colonial rule, the
asymmetrical transfer of germ plasm from the colony to the mother country was
more or less perceived as ‘an internal affair’ of the colonial empires. In juridical
and political terms, the colonial powers construed their tropical territories as part
of the empire or of the larger metropolis. For example, germ plasm from British
colonies in Asia and Africa was routinely transferred not only to the Royal Botanic

J. Kloppenburg, First The Seed – The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492–2000 (1988), at 155.
The population nearly doubled in the space of one century (1750–1850).
Kloppenburg, Supra note 7. The Irish and, indeed, practically the entire British working class relied on
potatoes for subsistence.
10. The imperial botanic gardens were found in Australia, Africa, the Caribbean, India – virtually all corners
of the globe. See L. Brockway, Science and Colonial Expansion: The Role of the British Botanic Gardens
(1979).
7.
8.
9.
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Gardens in London but to other parts of the British empire as if the latter were
a single juridical entity, if not de jure, at least de facto. Thus the transfer of plant
germ plasm was not conducted under the notion that plants constituted a free good
and a resource for all peoples of the world. Rather, the prevailing theory was that a
colonial outpost was merely one of several other projections of an imperial and large
state.
Under the colonial regime, scientists, breeders, and collectors, particularly from
the colonizing world, collected and transferred a huge quantity and diversity of
economically useful or rare plant life forms to botanic gardens, gene banks, research institutions, and breeding programmes which were scattered across the
various outposts of the colonial empires. In the absence of the earlier imposition of legal restrictions on this ‘intra-state’ transfer of germ plasm, the unfounded
notion thus emerged, especially among latter-day environmental activists,11 nongovernmental organizations, and some writers that plant genetic resources, even in
the post-colonial era, constitute a part of the common heritage.12 This general notion
is fallacious and unfounded. A sober analysis of state practice and other evidences
of international law in the colonial and post-colonial eras clearly shows that there
has never been a regime of common heritage as applied to plant genetic resources.
As the subsequent stage of this analysis argues, the common heritage concept is
too new and circumscribed in its ambit to be the legal basis or justiﬁcation of the
colonial transfer of plant germ plasm in the era spanning 1492–1992.

2. P LANT GENETIC RESOURCES AND THE COMMON HERITAGE
CONCEPT IN THE POST - COLONIAL AGE
The concept of the common heritage of mankind (CHM)13 entered the lexicon of international law a few decades ago.14 Since then, there has been ambiguity in deﬁning its true scope and meaning.15 Notwithstanding the uncertainties surrounding the meaning of its constitutive terms, one major factor
11. P. Mooney, Seeds of the Earth: A Private Or Public Resource? (1979).
12. J. Mugabe et al. (eds.), Access to Genetic Resources – Strategies for Sharing Beneﬁts (1997), at 7.
13. C. Joyner, ‘Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1986) 35 ICLQ 190; A.
Kiss, ‘Conserving the Common Heritage of Mankind’, (1990) 59 Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico
773–7.
14. R. Wolfrun, ‘The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1983) 43 Heidelberg Journal of International
Law 312; G. Danilenko, ‘The Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law’, (1988) 13 Annals
of Air and Space Law 247–65. While some scholars attribute the origins of the common heritage concept to
Arvid Pardo, Malta’s ambassador to the United Nations, in 1967, others point to Aldo Cocca’s statement some
months earlier, at the deliberations for peaceful uses of outer space in 1967. It seems, however, that Pardo was
the ﬁrst to articulate the concept of common heritage of mankind as a potential principle of international
law. In any event, the notion of CHM does not pre-date 1967 and as such, the concept is of very recent vintage.
The implication is that it could not have governed transaction on plants prior to its debut.
15. For an examination of the confused state of thinking on the concept of CHM, see S. Gorove, ‘The Concept
of “Common Heritage of Mankind”: A Political, Moral or Legal Innovation?’, (1972) San Diego Law Review
390; L. F. E. Goldie, ‘A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of the ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1983) 10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 69–112; M. White, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind:
An Assessment’, (1982) 14 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 509–42; E. Tenenbaum, ‘A World
Park in Antarctica: The Common Heritage of Mankind’, (1990) 10 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 109–36;
A. Blaser, ‘The Common Heritage in its Inﬁnite Variety: Space Law and the Moon in the 1990s’, (1990) 5
Journal of Law and Technology 79–99.
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remains constant: that is, the narrowness of the scope of the concept. Common
heritage16 has only attained juridical mention within the ambit of claims of communal rights on areas or resources which lie outside the limits of state jurisdictional
authority: a sort of res communis humanitatis.17 In other words, it is a term and concept
applied to the so-called global commons.18 These include the ocean ﬂoor,19 outer
space,20 the Moon21 and Antarctica.22
It is thus apparent that the notion of common heritage is the very opposite of
principles of international law governing access to or control or dominion over
assets or properties, particularly natural resources which fall within the jurisdiction
of a recognized state. In effect, sovereignty and jurisdiction over a territory is an
indefeasible aspect and character of statehood, and whatever natural resources fall
within the boundaries of a state are subject to the amplitude and magnitude of
state jurisdiction.23 This is a well-known principle of international law and need not
detain us here.24 It is equally beyond debate that international law is founded on the
theory of the formal equality of states. Consequently, states constitute the central
plank on which the complex ediﬁce of international law, international institutions,
and transnational relations are built.
Ideologically, the notion of common heritage is a political and rhetorical tool
of convenience used by both the industrialized and the industrializing worlds
whenever it suits their respective interests. Assertions of the applicability or lack
thereof of the principle of common heritage to any resource by either the North or
the South should be critically examined before being accepted as a correct expression of the law. For example, the concept of common heritage was a counterpart of

16.
17.

18.
19.

20.

21.
22.

23.
24.

A. Cocca, ‘Mankind as the New Legal Subject: A New Juridical Dimension Recognized by the United Nations’,
(1971) Proceedings of the 13th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 211. The notion of ‘mankind’ as a full-ﬂedged
legal entity has not yet come into juridical existence.
There are, however, some differences between common heritage and the notion of res communis humanitatis.
For further analysis of this issue, see M. Shaw, International Law (1986), 276; C. Bin, ‘The Legal Regime of
Airspace and Outer Space: The Boundary Problem, Functionalism Versus Spatialism: The Major Premises’
(1980) 5 Annals of Air and Space Law 323; J. Logue, ‘Could the Common Heritage Fund Proposal Break the
Deadlock in the UN Conference of the Law of the Sea?’ (1983) 2–3 International Property Investment Journal
283–357. Attempts to extend the concept of common heritage to the vexed issue of transfer of technology
have, however, failed. See ‘The Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology of May 6,
1980’, (1978) 17 ILM 462.
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (1972), at 258–86.
J. Dyke and C. Yuen, ‘Common Heritage v. Freedom of the Seas: Which Governs the Seabed?’, (1982) 19 San
Diego Law Review 493; E. Reiley, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: Ocean Floor Use’ (1985) 5 (March)
California Lawyer 15; M. Harry, ‘The Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind or Arena for Unilateral
Exploitation?’, (1992) 40 Naval Law Review 207–28.
L. Tennen, ‘Outer Space: A Preserve for All Humankind’ (1979) 1 Houston Journal of International Law 145;
N. Mateesco-Matte, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind and Outer Space: Toward a New International Order
for Survival’, (1987) 12 Annals of Air and Space Law 313–36; B. Hoffstadt, ‘Moving the Heavens: Lunar Mining
and the Common Heritage of Mankind in the Moon Treaty’, (1994) 42 UCLA Law Review 575.
C. Christol, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities
of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’, (1980) 14 International Lawyer 429.
C. Joyner, ‘Antarctica and the Law of the Sea: Rethinking the Current Legal Dilemmas’, (1981) San Diego
Law Review 415; M. Kyriak, ‘The Future of the Antarctic Treaty System: An Examination and Evaluation of
the “Common Heritage” and “World Park” Proposals for an Alternative Antarctic Regime’, (1992) 7 Auckland
University Law Review 105–26; E. Tenenbaum, ‘A World Park in Antarctica: The Common Heritage of Mankind’,
(1990) 10 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 109–36.
J. Crawford, The Creation of States at International Law (1979); Rainbow Warrior Incident (1985) ILR 74.
R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 1 (1992), at 563–80.
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the doomed movement by the ‘developing world’ for a new international economic
order (NIEO). In the movement for a new international economic order, the common
heritage concept was thus primarily designed to deny the technologically advanced
group of states of the North the legal right to exploit and lay claims of rights of
ownership over the last frontiers of the world, such as the international seabed and
Antarctica.25
Conversely, the industrialized states which have largely rejected the notion of
common heritage as a general principle of international law, particularly with respect to the South’s claim for a new international economic order, have been quite
enthusiastic in proclaiming that the common heritage concept applies to plant genetic resources which are found mostly in the South. Needless to add, the North’s
argument is borne out of group self-interest. As Kloppenburg further explains:
[C]ommon heritage and the norm of free exchange of plant germ plasm have greatly
beneﬁted the advanced capitalist nations, which not only have the greatest need for
and capacity to collect exotic plant materials but also have a superior scientiﬁc capacity
to use them.26

Yet again, when the industrializing states believed that their agricultural outputs could be dramatically improved by adopting the intensive methods of farming developed by the industrialized states and by appropriating the so-called high
yield varieties (HYVs) created by the industrialized states from germ plasm originally collected from the industrializing states, the former enthusiastically declared all plant life forms (including the high yield varieties) to be a common
heritage.
Naturally, the industrialized states rejected this characterization of genetically
modiﬁed high yield varieties as common heritage. Henry Vogel has articulated and
analyzed North–South polemics and posturing on the applicability of common
heritage within the concept of the conﬂict between privatization of the beneﬁts
of plant resources and socialization of the costs of access to those resources. In his
words:
[G]enetic resources are a prime example of privatization having more to do with power
relationships in the contemporary world than with neo-classical economic science.
Until quite recently, Northern industry has been able to privatize the beneﬁts of biotechnologies that derive from genetic resources while at the same time, socializing the
cost of access to those genetic resources. Genetic resources were free under the doctrine
known as the ‘common heritage of mankind’. Being on the opposite sides of the trade,
Southern countries have long wanted to privatize genetic resources but socialize access
to biotechnologies. Rather than arguing for a symmetrical reform and the privatization

25.

26.

B. Larschan and B. Brennan, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in International Law’, (1982–3) 21
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 305; J. Frakes, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the
Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?’,
(2003) 21 Wisconsin International Law Journal 409–34.
Kloppenburg, supra note 7, at 167. See also J. Trotti, ‘Compensation Versus Colonization: A Common Heritage
Approach to the Use of Indigenous Medicine in Developing Western Pharmaceuticals’, (2001) 56 Food and
Drug Law Journal 367–82.
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of proﬁts and costs, both the North and the South would like asymmetrical reform:
the privatization of just their proﬁts and the socialization of just their costs. For the
North this would mean that the South gives up its genetic resources but recognizes its
intellectual property rights (IPRs); for the South this would mean that the North gives
up its IPRs but recognizes a Southern claim on the use of its genetic resources. In the
struggle for inefﬁciency and inequity, the North is winning.27

Accordingly, the common heritage notion as espoused by both sides of the global
economic and industrial divide has been more or less a barely disguised ideological
tool in the politics of and struggle for control of plant genetic resources across the
globe. Leaving ideology aside, the question remains whether in international law
there is a settled principle of common heritage and, if so, whether such a principle
governs the regime on plant resources where such resources are located within the
boundaries of sovereign states.
In answering this question, particularly the second limb, reference must be had to
the pertinent sources of international law, particularly the primary sources, namely
treaties and customary international law.28 On the ﬁrst limb of the question posed
above, it seems that notwithstanding the substantial confusion which has afﬂicted
the concept of common heritage, ﬁve major characteristics may be said to delimit it
under contemporary international law.29
First, the area to which the concept of common heritage may apply must be
free from appropriation of any kind and, hypothetically, must be managed by all
states.30 Second, under the proposed common heritage regime, it follows that all
peoples would be expected to co-manage the common space in their capacity as
representatives of mankind. In other words, there can be no supervening national
interests wherever the concept of common heritage is deemed to be applicable. Third,
whatever economic beneﬁts accrue from this global management of a common space
would vest in the global community. These are the necessary inferences to be dawn
from the element or quality of the term ‘common’ as used in the notion of common
heritage.
Fourth, the area of common global ownership must be a completely demilitarized
zone where only peaceful activities are conducted.31 The ﬁnal element concerns the

27.
28.
29.

30.
31.

J. Vogel, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Convention on Biological Diversity: The Rationale for a Cartel’ (on ﬁle
with the author). Persons interested in this article may reach Professor Vogel at henvogel@earthling.net.
Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Concluded, at San Francisco, 26 June 1945, entered
into force 24 Oct. 1945, 1976 YBUN 1052.
Most of these characteristics are derived from Pardo’s thesis in his historic statement. See ‘Declaration and
Treaty Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor,
Underlying the Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of Their Resources in
the Interests of Mankind’, UN Doc. A/AC.105 /C.2/SR (17 Aug. 1967). See also A. Pardo, The Common Heritage:
Selected Papers on Oceans and World Order 1967–1974 (1975); H. Rana, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind
and the Final Frontier: A Revaluation of Values Constituting the International Legal Regime for Outer Space
Activities’ (1994) 26 Rutgers Law Journal 225–50.
For a comprehensive, albeit debatable, analysis of the concept of CHM in international law, see K. Baslar, The
Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (1998).
Ibid., at 83; D. Wolter, ‘The Peaceful Purpose Standard of the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in Outer
Space Law’, (1985) 9 ASIL International Law Journal 117–46; D. Shraga, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind:
The Concept and Its Application’, (1986) 15 Annales D’Etudes Internationales 45.
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conduct of scientiﬁc activities in the area under the common heritage principle. Such
research must be freely and openly permissible and the physical environment and
ecology of the area in question must not be impaired. Even a cursory examination
of these elements and an examination of their compatibility with the principles of
state sovereignty clearly show the inapplicability of the notion of common heritage
to plant life forms within the boundaries of states.
Although the concept of common heritage has enjoyed mention and recognition
in some treaties, especially treaties dealing with the deep seabed,32 the Moon,33 outer
space and celestial bodies,34 and the continent of Antarctica,35 some scholars doubt
whether the common heritage concept has become a generally accepted principle
of international law. In other words, there seems to be a scholarly debate, perhaps
semantic, whether recognition of the concept or notion of common heritage in treaty
law is synonymous with the status of ‘generally accepted principle of international
law’.36 Strict ‘constructionists’ or purists of international law would readily argue
that common heritage is not yet a generally accepted principle of international law.
On the face of it, there are some arguments which may be made for this rather
doctrinaire, perhaps, sterile point of view.
Strictly speaking, for a concept to be considered as a generally accepted principle of
international law, ‘the content of the principle must be distinct enough so as to enable
it to be part of the general corpus of international law’.37 Given the problematic
meanings of the constitutive words ‘common’, ‘heritage’ and ‘mankind’, it may
therefore be doubted whether any coherent or logical clariﬁcation of the concept
exists in international law. The word ‘common’, for example, refers to something
which belongs to all. Expressly and impliedly, management of such entities or
resource requires the consent and representative mandate of all who have property
in the thing held in common. The term ‘heritage’ refers to property which has
been inherited. It is impossible to conceive of the relevance of this term to plants,
which may well be unknown to humanity, let alone capable of being passed on as a
heritage. As already indicated, the term ‘mankind’ has not yet acquired any juridical
meaning in international law. Accordingly, scholars such as Wolfrun, Gorove, and
Joyner would seem to be on solid ground in their argument that the concept of

32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

For example, Part XI of the 1982 UNCLOS provides that ‘the Area [i.e. the seabed and ocean ﬂoor beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction] and its resources are the common heritage of mankind’. See Art. 137,
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (With Annex V), concluded at Montego Bay, 10 Dec. 1982,
entered into force 16 Nov. 1994. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122; reprinted in (1982) 21 ILM 1261; Declaration of
Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction; adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 17 Dec. 1970. UN Doc. A/RES/2749 (XXV),
(1971) 10 ILM 220.
Agreement Concerning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 5 Dec. 1979, (1979)
18 ILM 1434.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 610 UNTS 205.
Antarctic Treaty, concluded in Washington, DC, 1 Dec. 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961, reprinted in 40
UNTS 71.
See, e.g., Joyner, supra note 13, at 198.
Wolfrun, supra note 14, at 333. For an authoritative and fresh insight into the vexed question of precision of
custom in international law, see the seminal work of A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law
(1971).
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common heritage is afﬂicted with internal inconsistency if not anarchy. However,
these arguments are not wholly watertight and may be countered.
First, it is a matter of common knowledge and experience among international
lawyers that there are principles of international law which, although not known for
their clarity, are nonetheless generally accepted as principles of international law. In
other words, conceptual clarity is not a condition precedent to the emergence of any
legal concept as ‘a generally accepted principle’ of international law. Ready examples
of concepts include the principles of sustainable development and precaution. In
short, although conceptual clarity is a virtue and a desirable value in the evolution
of legal norms, absence of conceptual clarity is not necessarily fatal to the status and
characterization of a concept or principle of law as a ‘generally accepted principle
of international law’. After all, in the development of international law, vague terms
and phrases often ripen into coherent and clearer concepts and principles of law.
Second, it would seem that the crucial factor in determining general acceptance
of principles of international law is that the resultant state practice from allegiance
to and compliance with that concept (regardless of the clarity of the concept itself),
in this case, common heritage, must be demonstrably evident and accompanied
with the requisite opinio juris38 by states and compliant entities. A corollary to this
requirement is that the custom of acceptance of that concept or principle, in this
case, the common heritage concept, must be widespread. Here, it has to be conceded
that the common heritage concept stands on a shaky ground.
It is remarkable that, apart from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) treaty, treaties which recognize the common heritage concept as a principle of international law have witnessed the lowest numbers of ratiﬁcations. This
phenomenon is particularly signiﬁcant in the context of the global implications of
the common heritage concept. For example, the Moon treaty has only the barest
number of ratiﬁcations for its becoming effective – ﬁve. Apart from this miserably
poor number of ratiﬁcations, none of the ﬁve states parties to the Moon treaty,
namely Austria, Chile, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Uruguay – is a spacefaring state. When this fact is juxtaposed with the universal signiﬁcance of the Moon
and the ubiquitous nature of the usefulness of celestial bodies and space in daily
life (satellite television, telephony, weather forecasting, and so on) the low number of ratiﬁcations by states of those treaties which promote the common heritage
concept leaves it in a weak position in its claim to be considered as a ‘generally
accepted principle of international law’. The inescapable conclusion is that while
the concept of common heritage is a principle of international law, whether it is ‘a
generally accepted principle’ is open to debate.
Assuming, especially in relation to UNCLOS, that the CHM concept is a generally
accepted principle of international law, the second limb of the question – whether the
‘principle’ of common heritage is applicable to plant resources – deserves further
examination. In resolving this issue, it is equally useful to pay due regard to the
sources and evidences of international law, the principles of state sovereignty, and
38.

Joyner, supra note 13, at 198. Professor Joyner thus concludes that CHM is at best a philosophical notion with
the potential of emerging and crystallizing as a legal norm.
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the way in which these principles apply to plant life forms. As already noted, Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice details the general sources and
evidences of international law.
First, even if the concept of common heritage has been considered to be a generally
accepted principle of international law prior to the CBD, no international treaty or
convention characterized or designated plants as part of the common heritage of
mankind. Indeed, it is striking that unlike other ‘emergent’ or ‘ﬂedgling’ concepts
and principles in international law, particularly on the environment, there is not
a single declaration or resolution by the UN General Assembly which refers to
plants located within a state’s jurisdiction as constituting part of the common
heritage of mankind.39 Even the recently adopted FAO International Treaty On
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture reiterates that plants are part of
national sovereignty of states. Article 10 thereof provides:
[I]n their relationships with other States, the Contracting Parties recognize the sovereign rights of States over their own plant genetic resources for food and agriculture,
including that the authority to determine access to those resources rests with national
governments and is subject to national legislation.

More signiﬁcantly, all references to common heritage in treaties and declarations
of the organs of the United Nations have consistently been in the context of the
remaining, if any, frontiers on Earth, and celestial space and objects. None of the
treaties that mention common heritage pertains to spaces traditionally under state
sovereignty and jurisdiction, such as plants and plant habitats.
The absence of a treaty law basis for the purported applicability of the common
heritage concept to plant life forms is not a remarkable omission or a coincidence.
Since the emergence of the Westphalian paradigm of international law and relations,
international law is state-centric and is founded on the control of each state over its
own territories, subject to other principles of international law.40 For example, early
international law instruments such as the Montevideo Convention clearly emphasized the point, Article 8 providing that no state has the right to intervene in the
internal or external affairs of another. Indeed, all aspects of international law, particularly customary international law and treaty law on state sovereignty, implicitly
or expressly recognize the undoubted powers of states to regulate access to plant
life forms within their respective jurisdictions.41 Contemporary international law
instruments are similarly unequivocal in their assertion and reiteration of domestic
state sovereignty and the inadmissibility of external interference in internal state
39. South West Africa Cases [1960] ICJ Rep. 6, at 323. See also Art. 10, FAO Treaty on Plants, adopted 3 Nov. 2001;
available online at <fao.org/ag/cgrfa.IU.htm>, accessed on 24 Nov. 2001.
40. See for example the Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS 16, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
and Optional Protocols, done at Vienna, 18 April 1961, reprinted in 500 UNTS 95–239; Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), UN Dec. A/5217 (1970), at
121; H. Hannum and R. Lillich, ‘The Concept of Autonomy in International Law’, (1980) 74 AJIL 858; 1933
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 26 Dec. 1933, 165 LNTS 19.
41. Jennings and Watts, supra note 24, at 563–80. See, e.g., International Convention for the Protection of Plants,
16 April 1929, reprinted in (1931–32) 126 LNTS 305.
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affairs. Clearly, prior to the CBD or FAO Plant for Food Treaty of 2001, there has been
no treaty-law support for the notion that plant germ plasm from the industrializing
states, or elsewhere for that matter, is part of the global commons.
In the absence of treaty law support for common heritage on plants in the pre-1992
era, attention may be shifted to customary international law governing the transfer
of plants during the same era, 1492–1992. Here again, the notion of a common
heritage regime on plants ﬁnds no support. First, the concept of common heritage
entered global discourse and law literature only in the late 1960s, compared with the
Columbian age of colonial transfer of plant genetic resources across the globe and the
transfer or appropriation of plant life forms through colonial instruments including
‘botanic gardens’ and ‘research’ institutions, which largely occurred during the
colonial and immediate post-colonial era, starting in 1492 and extending till the
late 1960s. Thus, assuming but not conceding the common heritage concept to be
a principle of customary international law, such a recent principle could not have
governed or regulated activities which took place hundreds of decades before it came
into existence. Customary international law does not operate retroactively.
Furthermore, an examination of relevant state practice during the period in
question, 1492–1960s, shows that indeed, the concept of common heritage has no
roots or support in customary international law. That is to say, state practice or
custom42 accompanied by evidence of opinio juris clearly shows that the notion of
a common heritage of plant life forms is not part of customary international law
during the period in question. A careful analysis of state practice shows that states
have always sought to protect and sustain their monopoly of and hegemony over
economically useful plants. Thus, even though states, particularly the gene-rich
former colonies, were made to yield their plant life forms to their colonial masters
as contributions to international agricultural ‘research’, such practices lacked the
requisite elements of customary international law. This is so because the element of
opinio juris sive necessitatis, which Anthony D’Amato in his classical disquisition has
beautifully reformulated as the articulation of reciprocal international behaviour
with legal consequences,43 is conspicuously missing.
Here, the psychological element involved is the articulated expectation in state
relations that a particular act or omission will have legal implications. It is a voluntary and volitional choice to be bound in law by a free act. In the absence of
the element of articulated expectation of reciprocal and juridically signiﬁcant behaviour, otherwise known as opinio juris sive necessitatis, the transfer of plant germ plasm
from the South to the North through the instrumentalism of international ‘research
centres’ or colonialist institutions lacks the legal sense of obligatoriness which is the
essential characteristic of customary international law. As such, transfers of plant
life forms under such circumstances do not amount to an expression of customary
international law of common heritage on plant life forms.
M. Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’ (1974–5) 47 BYIL 12, at 36; D’Amato, supra note 37,
at 75.
43. D’Amato, supra note 37, at 75. McDougal and his colleagues make the same point when he refers to it as
‘world constitutive prescription’. See M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, and M. Reisman, ‘The World Constitutive
Process of Authoritative Decision’ (1967) 19 Journal of Legal Education 403.
42.
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In international law, repetition of the colonial practice, no matter how frequent,
would not yield a legally binding obligation unless it could be shown that the
practice was articulated and carried out in the belief that there was a legally binding obligation to do so.44 This distinction is crucial, as it constitutes the divide
between a mere social usage and a legally binding principle of customary international law.45 Indeed, a close study and analysis of relevant state practice shows
clearly that states have always sought to keep economically useful plants out
of the reach of other states. This practice is particularly evident in the case of
states with the requisite enforcement mechanisms for such an exclusionary policy
or the ability to police their territorial borders and control the dissemination of
their plant resources. Of course, the reproducibility of plants makes this objective
difﬁcult.
Notwithstanding this inherent problem with controlling the spread of plant
resources, states have largely conducted themselves in a manner clearly supportive of
the position that they had sovereignty over plants within their jurisdiction and were
under no legal obligation to grant free access to such plant resources. For example,
in the colonial era, economic and military powers such as France, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom adopted elaborate and often stringent measures to ‘keep
useful [plant] materials out of competitors’ hands’.46
Examples of state control over plants are legion. The French were so determined
to retain their monopoly on the indigo dye trade that the export of indigo seeds
from French Antigua was made a capital offence.47 Prior to the era of such treaties
as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the government of Ethiopia (one of the
rare African states to escape formal colonialism) embargoed the export of coffee
germ plasm. Furthermore, it was always difﬁcult to obtain black peppercorns from
India, and Ecuador did not freely supply cocoa germ plasm to other cocoa-producing
states. Peru and Bolivia once made trade in quinine (an extract from the bark of the
cinchona tree native to those countries) a government monopoly. No state could at
that time have seriously argued that such actions violated international law.
Desperate and draconian measures were sometimes taken by states to maintain
control over plants in their territories. For example, the Dutch, in order to maintain
their global monopoly on the supply of nutmegs, destroyed all nutmeg and clove
trees in the Moluccas except those on three islands where they located their plantations.48 It was this tight control of the transfer of plant germ plasm in the period
before the Convention on Biological Diversity treaty and in the colonial era that
compelled some states to engage in audacious attempts to break the monopoly of
other states on some plants of key economic importance. In some cases, some states
sponsored or condoned criminal activities such as the smuggling of plants. In order
44. Paquette Habana, 175 US 677 (1900).
45. G. Tunkin, ‘Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International Law’, (1961) 49 California
Law Review 419; L. Kopelmanas, ‘Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law’, (1937) 28 BYIL
127.
46. Kloppenburg, supra note 7, at 154; C. de Klemm, Biological Diversity Conservation and the Law – Legal
Mechanisms for Conserving Species and Ecosystems (1993), at 56.
47. Kloppenburg, supra note 7, at 154.
48. Ibid.
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to break the Brazil’s iron grip on the supply of rubber (Brazil controlled 95 per cent
of the global trade in rubber at the time), the British in 1876 encouraged and aided
Henry Wickham in successfully smuggling out 70,000 rubber seeds in a boat which
eventually reached British colonies in Asia. Wickham’s bold escape with the rubber
seeds literally sowed the seeds of the collapse of the Brazilian monopoly on rubber
production.49
It is evident from the above instances and analysis that the undoubted powers
of states to regulate access to and the use of plant life forms within their domains
has always been an inherent and intrinsic aspect of statehood. In addition, domestic
legislation restraining or controlling access to forests, wildlife, parks, and trade in
certain plant species has always been part of the exercise of state sovereignty over
plant resources, even in the colonial age. Virtually all states in Europe and the
Americas and other strong states fashioned on the Westphalian paradigm had domestic laws regulating various means of husbanding plant resources, such as farms,
forests, parks, and so on. Such laws are so generally known as to obviate the need for
citation here.50
In addition, prior to the emergence of the notion of a common heritage of plants,
most countries, if not all, had national quarantine laws regulating the importation
of diseased or potentially diseased plant resources. Yet it has not been suggested
that such legislative powers regarding plants were dependent or contingent on
supranational permission or the pleasure of an external transnational authority, or
even the so-called concept of common heritage. Such authority pre-dated the 1992
CBD and the 2001 FAO treaty. For example, pursuant to the power to regulate access
to plant resources, the International Covenant for the Protection of Plants, signed
in Rome on 16 April 1929,51 mandated the contracting states to ‘establish relevant
machineries for the regulation of the import and export of plants’.52
States have always had as an inherent part of their status as sovereign entities
the legal authority to regulate the inﬂow and outﬂow of plant life forms within
their own domestic jurisdiction. In effect, the concept of state sovereignty over

49.

K. Bosselman, ‘Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity’, (1995) 7 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 111. Brazil now manages
with an insigniﬁcant 5 per cent share of the world rubber trade. The multi-billion-dollar rubber industry is
today dominated by UK and US conglomerates, Dunlop and Firestone, with massive plantations in Liberia
and Malaysia respectively.
50. Such laws include the Indian Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972, the Papua New Guinea Fauna (Protection and
Control) Act of 1976, and the Ugandan Forest Act and the Kenya Forest Act, both of 1942.
51. Art. 4 provides as follows:
The Contracting States undertake to enact all necessary measures both to prevent and combat plant diseases
and pests and to supervise the importation of plants and parts of plants, in particular those consigned from
countries not as yet possessing any ofﬁcial organization for the protection of plants. When Contracting
States require that plants or parts of plants to be imported shall be accompanied by a health certiﬁcate issued
by a competent ofﬁcial agent duly authorized by the exporting state, the Contracting States must conform
to the provisions of the present Convention.
Art. 6 proceeds further by providing that ‘each State retains the right to inspect and place in quarantine
plants or parts of plants, or temporarily and exceptionally to prohibit their importation, even when the
consignments are accompanied by a health certiﬁcate’.
52. Ibid., Art. 4.
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plant resources falls within the more extensive concept and principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR).53 In the governance of the same subject
matter, the concept of permanent sovereignty54 and common heritage are thus
mutually exclusive.55
The conﬂict between the common heritage concept and the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is best dramatized by the Amazon issue. The
industrialized states have long argued that Brazil should not (this is clearly distinct
from ‘does not’) have absolute sovereignty over the Amazon region.56 Approximately
three-ﬁfths of the length of the Amazon river lies in Brazil. The Amazon region comprises some 42 per cent of Brazilian territory. It produces 50 per cent of the world’s
oxygen57 and a substantial part of the world’s fresh water and biodiversity.58 Given
its universal importance, it is very tempting to misconstrue the Amazon region as a
common heritage of mankind.
However, the concern expressed by the industrialized states over Brazilian
(mis)use of the Amazon region has never really impressed the Brazilians, who
insist that ‘we are masters of our destiny and will not permit any interference in
our territory’.59 Thus, concerns over Brazilian (mis)management60 of the Amazon
region would not entitle any state or a group of states to assert a right of individual or
collective extra-territorial jurisdiction over Brazilian Amazonia. At best, other states
or entities may express the requisite amount of ‘concern’ over the use or misuse
of such resources occurring within the boundaries of sovereign states. By the same
token, arguments by Third World countries that technological products protected
by national intellectual property regimes constitute a part of the common heritage
of mankind and are thus freely available to all peoples have been resisted by robust
and unequivocal rebuttals by industrialized states.
53.

54.

55.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

PSNR emerged and developed after the end of the Second World War to afﬁrm and assert the sovereignty
of developing countries over their own natural resources. It seems to have matured from a ‘fundamental
principle of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) to the same status of jus cogens similar to the right
of self-determination in the present international order’. Baslar, supra note 30, at 137.
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII); Principle 21
of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Art. 30 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of 1974
(UNGAOR 3281, XXIV); Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. For an excellent and exhaustive treatment of
the subject, see N. Schrijver, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (1997).
Some scholars have thus opined that the common heritage of mankind regime can only start at the point
where it is agreed that the PSNR regime ends.
N. Schrijver, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources Versus the Common Heritage of Mankind:
Complementary or Contradictory Principles of International Economic Law?’ in E. M. G. Denters, P. Peters,
and P. J. I. M. de Waart (eds.), International Law and Development (1988); S. Schwebel, Justice in International Law
(1994), at 401.
R. M. McClearly, ‘The International Communities’ Claim to Rights in Brazilian Amazonia’ (1991) 39 Political
Studies 691; J. Goldenberg and E. R. Durham, ‘Amazonia and National Sovereignty’ (1992) 2 International
Environmental Affairs 22.
Hence Cocca’s argument that ‘the oxygen produced by the Amazonic [sic] forest . . . should be declared
common heritage of mankind’. See A. A. Cocca, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: Doctrine and Principle
of Space Law: An Overview’, in 29th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1986), 17, at 22.
K. Zimmerman, ‘The Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon: Law, Politics, and International Cooperation’,
(1990) 21 Inter-American Law Review 513.
McClearly, supra note 56, at 692.
Internally, the ‘development’ of the Amazon region by the Brazilian government has literally destroyed the
habitat of the native Indians. The governor of Roraima declared in 1975, ‘an area as rich as this cannot afford
the luxury of conserving half a dozen Indian tribes who are holding back the development of Brazil’. Baslar,
supra note 30, at 185.
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The extent to which states may allow such concerns to inﬂuence their management or control of such plant resources depends on myriad factors, such as the need
for international co-operation, but no legal right may be exercised by other states
in respect of those plant resources. However, no state is self-sufﬁcient in matters of
biological resources and, more importantly, issues of conservation, use, and commercialization of plant resources are often intrinsically international in character.
Hence, international co-operation is virtually indefeasible in relation to plant germ
plasm.
Be that as it may, the common heritage concept is of recent vintage and states
have always had the right, perhaps unexplored, to determine, regulate, and control
access to plant life forms within their own jurisdiction. It is therefore incorrect to
assert, as some scholars have done,61 that prior to the emergence of the Convention
on Biological Diversity and the FAO Plant for Food Treaty, plant genetic resources
were part of the common heritage of mankind.
However, it has to be conceded that any lingering doubts on the status of plant
resources within the boundaries of sovereign states have been laid to rest by the
provisions of both the Convention on Biological Diversity and the FAO Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources. Both international instruments have clearly reiterated the
sovereignty of states over plant genetic resources occurring within the boundaries
of their jurisdiction. For instance, the Preamble to the Convention on Biological
Diversity unequivocally reafﬁrms ‘that States have sovereign rights over their own
biological resources’. Article 3 further provides:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

Further, Article 15 of the Convention, dealing with the sensitive issue of access
to genetic resources, reiterates the principle of sovereign jurisdiction of states over
plant genetic resources occurring within national boundaries. It thus provides that
‘recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the authority
to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national governments and is
subject to national jurisdiction’.
The FAO Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources re-echoes the norms of state sovereignty over plant genetic resources. Article 10 provides that ‘in their relationships
with other States, the Contracting Parties recognize the sovereign rights of States
over their own plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, including that the
authority to determine access to those resources rests with national governments
and is subject to national jurisdiction’.
Indeed, so pervasive is the norm of state sovereignty over plant genetic resources
that further citation of international and regional instruments on the subject is

61.

See, e.g., supra, note 11.
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unnecessary. However, a notable dimension to this norm is that states have a responsibility under international law to ensure the sustainable use of such plant
genetic resources. In other words, although state sovereignty over plant genetic
resources reigns supreme, other states have a legitimate right of ‘common concern’
on how those resources are conserved and exploited. At the present stage of international law, the outlines of the elements of the emerging regime of common concern
of mankind regarding plant genetic resources remain underdeveloped and fuzzy.
It would seem that the task of the contemporary scholar of international law on
plant genetic resources is to think through the maze of options on how to devise an
equitable and sustainable regime of access to plant genetic resources.

3. C ONCLUSION
This article has argued that plants have always remained subject to state control.
If there were any juridical doubts on this issue, it is fair to say that the Convention on Biological Diversity and the FAO Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources have
laid such doubts to rest. Accordingly, it is an error, or at least an overstatement, to
argue or posit, as some commentators have done,62 that these international legal
instruments created a ‘new’ regime of state sovereignty over plant life forms. The
correct position is that both these instruments merely reafﬁrmed an inherent,
pre-existing right of state jurisdiction over plant life forms. What has changed
in recent times is the stridency and vociferousness with which states, the generich industrializing states, are reasserting their right of sovereignty over plants
within their own jurisdiction. More importantly, contemporary normative thrusts
on the management of such plant resources have helped to raise the issue of
responsibility and duties of states as to how they manage and conserve such
resources.
Given the self-interest of states in matters pertaining to food security and the
industrial implications of plant genetic resources control,63 it is to be expected
that powerful states with huge interests in plant genetic resources would protest
against the re-emerging doctrine of national sovereignty over them. However, a
better response would rest in the articulation of fair and equitable regimes for the
sharing of the burdens and beneﬁts of plant genetic resources conservation and
development.64 This would be a far more constructive approach than unhelpful
rhetoric on the ownership of such resources.65

See, e.g, W. Lesser, Sustainable Use of Genetic Resources Under the Convention on Biological Diversity: Exploring
Access and Beneﬁt Sharing Issues (1997), at 99.
63. United States’ Declaration Made at the United Nations Environment Programme for the Adoption of the
Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity, issued 22 May 1992, (1993) 31 ILM 848.
64. D. Jenks, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity – An Efﬁcient Framework for the Preservation of Life on
Earth?’ (1995) 15 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 636.
65. R. Panjabi, ‘International Law and the Preservation of Species: An Analysis of the Convention on Biological
Diversity Signed at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992’, (1993) 11 Dickinson Journal of International Law 187, at 224.
62.
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